Patriots: The Vietnam War Remembered from All Sides by Christian G. Appy (Post War Era, Military & Foreign Policy)

Patriots: The Vietnam War Remembered from All Sides 

by Christian G. Appy 

Post War Era
Military & Foreign Policy

Thesis:

 The Vietnam War is divisive topic. The books uses the words of soldiers, pows, politicians, generals, antiwar activists, students, and civilians from both sides to demonstrate how many experienced this conflict differently. Appy wanted to open eyes to confront the war's full picture and how personal accounts contradict the collective memory of the conflict.

Specific examples/evidence that supports the thesis:

 The Vietnamese were dedicated to national sovereignty and independence. They had been abused by colonial rule of the  French (supported by Americans after WWII) and were willing to fight and die for autonomy. 

Interviews with US policy makers showed that they had no real understanding of what the Vietnamese were fighting for and why they seemed to have no breaking point. They believed there was some magic number of casualties and once they accomplished that, the Vietnamese would surrender. This was not the case. 

The brutality of the acts of war range from, soldiers wearing scalps, to annihilating villages, to chemical ware fare with agent orange. Veterans still carry remorse over their actions against innocents.

Summary:

What does this tell us about Military & Foreign Policy in the Post War Era?

 Military leadership during the Vietnam War was lacking. Policy makers and in country leaders had no clue what the Vietnamese were fighting for. They believed it would be an easy short-lived conflict and they never seemed to determine when enough was enough. US civilians were willing to send some troops but as the war escalated patience and acceptance from the American people dwindled, as soldier deaths increased and journalists began getting the stories out of what was really going on, protesters emerged in the largest antiwar movement we've ever had.

What parts of the book can be applied to lectures?

General Thoughts:

Excerpts from Book Reviews: 

My Highlighted Passages: 

One coastal target in the north was identified by Saigon intelligence as a rest and recuperation center for Viet Cong cadre, but the Vietnamese PT skipper said, “No, that’s a leper hospital.” My intelligence said it was a communist R and R center so that was that. We sent a team in there firing as they went, and they killed a lot of people. It turned out to be a leper hospital just as the Vietnamese officer had predicted. When the team got back I’ll never forget the look the skipper gave me. His eyes said everything. He pointed at me and said, “Hospital.” That really did a great deal of damage to our credibility.399

Our hope early on in Vietnam was to win the hearts and minds of the people, but that hope was destroyed by the South Vietnamese government’s failure to gain the people’s allegiance and by Westmoreland’s strategy of search-and-destroy.460

You simply pile on and crush ’em. That was Westmoreland’s approach in Vietnam. There was no subtlety. His idea was to go after people and kill them in great number.463

However, one of the basic problems was that the North Vietnamese had an almost bottomless pit of people with the determination to outlast the Americans. And they were able to engage us on terms favorable to themselves. They would inflict casualties and then disappear.466

Their strategic aim was to wear us down until the American public turned against the war. It worked. People thought, we keep taking terrible casualties and we’re not seeing any benefit.468

Some Americans claim that Hanoi ordered the attack to provoke the United States into these actions; that we did it specifically to kill Americans and planned to do so on a day when [U.S. National Security Adviser] McGeorge Bundy was in Saigon and [Soviet Premier] Alexei Kosygin was in Hanoi. I have never understood why the U.S. government regarded this attack as provocative. It was just a normal battle, part of a long-term dry-season offensive in the Highlands.499

We had such heated discussions about how to fight. Should we be on the offensive or defensive? It was a very hard question. Fighting the U.S. wasn’t easy. We had to rely on our creativity.518

I remember putting the stethoscope in my ears to listen to his pulse. I glanced at my watch and it was almost eleven o’clock. That’s all I can remember.716

Later my friends told me that we were hit by a bomb from a B-52. There were six of us in that room—myself, two male nurses, and three patients. I718

When I got home, I think everybody, including myself, was sick of the war. We abhorred it. It was not only cruel, it was absurd.727

We had guys whose morale was so damaged as a result of returning to the States after their first tour that they volunteered to come back. They could simply not stand to read the paper or watch the television. I couldn’t believe the newspaper clippings my family was sending me after the Tet Offensive2173

I had to tell these boys that had just served their country to get out of their country’s uniform as soon as they could. If they weren’t wearing their uniform then maybe they wouldn’t be targeted by the protesters. disappointed. I had grown up with World War II movies and everybody had a band or something to welcome them home. An ungrateful nation let some twenty-three-year-old stewardess welcome these guys home.2500

“We all have very serious misgivings about the direction of the war. We don’t want to be piling up American boys like cordwood fighting endless Asian troops. We feel that we can bring this war to a quick conclusion by using overwhelming naval and air power.2738

The assumption was that the North Vietnamese would sue for peace if we increased the level of punishment.2742

“So you’re going to cut them off, keep them from being reinforced, and then you’re going to bomb them into the Stone Age.2743

Air force chief McConnell said,

“Well, that’s not exactly it, but you’ve got to punish them.

“Do you fully support these ideas?

Both generals said they totally agreed

“You goddamn fucking assholes. You’re trying to get me to start World War III with your idiotic bullshit—your ‘military wisdom.

“You dumb shit. Do you expect me to believe that kind of crap? I’ve got the weight of the Free World on my shoulders and you want me to start World War III?

“I’m going to ask you a question and I want you to give me an answer. Imagine that you’re me—that you’re the president of the United States—and five incompetents come into your office and try to talk you into starting World War III. Then let’s see what kind of guts you have with the whole damn world to worry about. What would you do?

“Mr. President, we’ve obviously upset you.The understatement of the year.There are many things about the presidency only one human being can understand. You, Mr. President, are that human being. With that thought in mind, I cannot take your place, think your thoughts, know all you know, and tell you what I would do if I were you. I can’t do it, Mr. President. No man can honestly do it. It’s got to be your decision and yours alone. The risk is just too high. How can you fucking assholes ignore what China might do? You have just contaminated my office, you filthy shitheads. Get the hell out of here right now.2763

I think Johnson had already made up his mind long before they got there and was using his most forceful way to kill the plan. When I got back into the car with Admiral McDonald, he said,2767

“Never in my entire life did I ever expect to be put through something as horrible as what you just watched from the president of the United States to his five senior military advisers.2769

He was just destroyed. For three or four days they seriously considered a mass resignation—all of them. I think the reason they didn’t was that we were at war and they did not want to be labeled traitors who quit in the face of the enemy.2769

have low tolerance for Vietnam vets who blame everything that’s happened to them in the last thirty years on the twelve months they spent over there. The fact of the matter is that7108

ninety-five percent of vets are normal, functioning, completely well-adjusted people just like everybody else.7109

We also made a distinction between the ordinary solders who carried out orders and the policy makers who initiated the war.7181

wrote, but there was no way to know if he was still alive. In many cases people received letters saying everything was okay when, in fact, the writer had already been killed. So receiving a letter was a mixed blessing. At first you were so happy, but then you looked at the date it was written and started to worry all over again. I was separated from my husband for ten years and he was separated from our two children for thirteen.7187

Dissent was expressed from every quarter. Two hundred and fifty State Department employees signed a letter of protest and several of Kissinger’s top aides resigned in opposition to the policy.8220

xOver Here: The First World and American Society by David Kennedy (Progressive Era-WWI, Military & Foreign Policy, Politics)

Over Here: The First World War and American Society 

by David Kennedy

Progressive Era-WWI
Military & Foreign Policy
Politics

Thesis:

US involvement in WWI ultimately led to an end in the Progressive Era. Progressive rhetoric was used to build public support for the war but ultimately made the people feel manipulated. To fund the war, much of the advancements towards democratic power instituted by progressives were abandoned.

Specific examples/evidence that supports the thesis:

Summary:
The author explores the internal American effects of World War I. Domestic changes were drastic during the war period.

Under the auspices of the Espionage Act of June 1917 (which allowed Postmaster-General Burleson to aggressively censor the mail) and the Sedition Act of 1918 (which prohibited "any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the United States"), outspoken members of the left (among them Eugene Debs) were arrested and locked away for voicing dissent.
After the war, Wilson's 14 points were given little attention or reflection in the Treaty of Versailles, calling an end to the war. A treaty that was never ratified by the US. In addition the League of Nations, created to avoid another World War and to force countries to disarm, pushed for by Wilson, was not joined by the US and ultimately fell apart.

What does this tell us about Military and Foreign Policy in the Progressive Era-WWI?
Up to the point of US involvement in WWI, the US was proudly avoiding the war. The US was spending resources on Progressive reform efforts and had no interest in spending it on a European War. In order to support the war efforts President Wilson instituted policies that decreased the free expression of the people. In an attempt to frame US involvement as a moral imperative, Wilson gave his speech on the 14 points. Establishing a list of actions that, he and his advisers believed would prevent another World War, these included disarming, and destroying alliances, giving colonies their independence, and free trade. Unfortunately the 14 points were not adopted in the Treaty of Versailles and the treaty was not ratified by the US Senate, by then largely controlled by big business who had an interest in tariffs. 

What does this tell us about Politics in the Progressive Era-WWI?

The moral evangelism of the Progressive era had to re-frame their rhetoric to fit the war. Wilson always felt the minds and the hearts of the people must be won, he created the Committee on Public Information to bombard the public with the justifications for America's entry into WWI. Additionally, Espionage and Sedition Acts were passed to silence opposing opinions on the war. The US public, including Progressives mostly bought into the propaganda but found themselves demoralized by the outcome. Big business got richer and the power of the people was greatly reduced.

What parts of the book can be applied to lectures?

General Thoughts:

Excerpts from Book Reviews: 

"Here now we have the first contemporary synthesis of work accomplished with regard to America's internal experience in World War I."

"Wilsonians' (and Americans' continuing) unwillingness to exercise power in any formal, straightforward, or forceful way-of their phobic refusal to carry out the rationing, taxing, requisitioning, and coercing that European governments had long since undertaken. Such a renunciation of authority had a second unfortunate effect as well, for it led of necessity to the Wilson administration's deliberate propagandizing and agitation of the public as a means of achieving needed discipline, whipping up a patriotic hysteria that would ultimately undermine progressive forces politically and help to undo the benefits that groups like workers, blacks, and women derived from the war."

"Kennedy also discusses the war's cultural dimension. From diaries and other literary material he evokes the overseas experience of Pershing's "doughboys" and also describes and interprets the cultural struggle over the war's meaning in both literary and popular culture in the 1920s. Kennedy suggests, moreover, that as a cultural phenomenon the war crisis reveals a number of core American social values, including a deeply rooted suspicion of concentrated public power and a bias toward voluntarism in the construction of social institutions."

"Among the book's many strengths are a first-rate synthesis of recent work on economic and financial mobilization; a critical evaluation of Wilsonian economic diplomacy; convenient summaries of the war's impact on various social groups, including liberal intellectuals, women, blacks, organized labor, and political radicals; and a useful commentary on congressional and national party politics based upon private manuscript collections"

My Highlighted Passages: 

""war had killed something precious and perhaps irretrievable in the hearts of thinking men and women, namely a faith in the reasonableness, plasticity, and fundamental decency of "the people." (92)

"the war thus demonstrated the distasteful truth that voluntarism has its perils. Reliance on sentiment rather than strengthened sovereignty to mobilize a people for total war compounded the problem of requiring all people to do what but few people wished. That kind of coercion, no less insidious for its indirection -- perhaps doubly objectionable on that count -- had deep roots in liberal democratic culture, and was to become a salient feature of twentieth-century American life." (143)

"In effect, writers such as Hemingway, Dos Passos, and Cummings use the way to "launch a second attack on the cultural authority of the Old Guard -- the Old Guard that had promoted American entry into the war, and employed the full force of its rhetorical power to describe the war in terms compatible with its ancient values...The postwar writers of disillusionment protested less against the war itself than against a way of seeing and describing the war."

The Cold War: A New History by John Lewis Gaddis (Post War Era, Military & Foreign Policy)

The Cold War: A New History

by John Lewis Gaddis

Post War Era
Military & Foreign Policy

Thesis:

The Cold War changed what war meant and how wars would be fought for the world as a whole. The author hopes to correct the current misunderstanding that the Cold War was a war where dangers were not real and the threat of Soviet Union was exaggerated. In fact, the threat was very real and the world narrowly escaped detrimental destruction.

Specific examples/evidence that supports the thesis:

Summary:

The author first describes how capitalism and socialism were positioned in conflict with one another immediately following WWII. The US found itself in a powerful position after the war, with a relatively uneffected homeland and population. At the same time, Russia had suffered vastly during the war but had come out victorious, without Russia and the Eastern front, the allies could not have won on the European front. While Stalin accepted assistance to rebuild after the war, he was also preparing his people for the next war, he thought was inevitable as tensions between capitalist nations built back up after this war. 

The nuclear weapons used by the US were in large measure meant to force cooperation of the Soviets during peace negotiations for WWII. In this way, they were effective. However, the USSR also had spies and a nuclear program of their own.  

What does this tell us about Military and Foreign Policy in the Post War Era?

What parts of the book can be applied to lectures?

This book is an excellent over view of the events and forces involved in the Cold War Era. This is the author's field of research and the subject he most often teaches. This is his abbreviated version of history and it was very helpful.

General Thoughts:

Excerpts from Book Reviews: 

My Highlighted Passages: 

Stalin’s was a very different vision: a settlement that would secure his own and his country’s security while simultaneously encouraging the rivalries among capitalists that he believed would bring about a new war. Capitalist fratricide, in turn, would ensure the eventual Soviet domination of Europe. 451

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Despite their revolutionary character those bombs were built under an old and familiar set of assumptions: that if they worked, they would be used. Few of the thousands of people employed in the wartime Manhattan Project saw their jobs as differing from the design and production of conventional weapons. Atomic bombs were meant to be dropped, as soon as they were ready, on whatever enemy targets yet remained. 835

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Technology might have changed, but the human habit of escalating violence had not. 839

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And Truman himself had left it to the Army Air Force to determine when and where the first atomic weapons would be dropped: the names “Hiroshima” and “Nagasaki” were no more familiar to him, before the bombs fell, than they were to anyone else.10 859

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After that happened, though, Truman demanded a sharp break from past practice. He insisted that a civilian agency, not the military, control access to atomic bombs and their further development. 861

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But Truman did have one unique qualification for demanding a return to Clausewitz: after August, 1945, he had the ability, by issuing a single order, to bring about more death and destruction than any other individual in history had ever been able to accomplish. That stark fact caused this ordinary man to do an extraordinary thing. He reversed a pattern in human behavior so ancient that its origins lay shrouded in the mists of time: that when weapons are developed, they will be used. 881

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But he also tried to be nice about it: at one point, while bullying an American visitor, Hubert Humphrey, he paused to ask where his guest was from. When Humphrey pointed out Minneapolis on the map, Khrushchev circled it with a big blue pencil. “That’s so I don’t forget to order them to spare the city when the rockets fly,” he explained amiably.43 1122

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Wilson’s vision, at least, had been revived: the contest of ideas that he and Lenin had begun during World War I would continue now within the emerging 1500

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Cold War. That became apparent in three important speeches, given within thirteen months of one another in 1946–47. 1501

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Stalin made the first one in Moscow on February 9, 1946, and in it he went back to basics. He restated Marx’s condemnation of capitalism for distributing wealth unevenly. He reiterated Lenin’s claim that, as a result, capitalists were likely to go to war with one another. He drew from this the conclusion that peace could come only when communism had triumphed throughout the world. 1502

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Winston Churchill, recently turned out of office, gave the second speech in the improbable setting of Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, with President Truman sitting at his side. 1508

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an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of ancient states of central and eastern Europe. . . . [A]ll these famous cities and the populations around them . . . are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence, but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow. 1511

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Truman himself gave the third speech a year later, on March 12, 1947, in which he asked Congress for aid to Greece and Turkey and announced the Truman Doctrine, with its implied American commitment to assist victims of aggression and intimidation throughout the world. 1518

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His ideological justification for these measures was Wilsonian: the world was now divided between “two ways of life”—not communism versus capitalism, but democracy versus 1519

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authoritarianism, a distinction that allowed him to link this new American involvement in European affairs with the ones that had preceded it in 1917 and in 1941. 1521

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United States, after World War II, assumed peacetime responsibilities beyond its hemisphere. Stalin’s challenge had helped to bring that about. 1531

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He did so with a view to preserving communism: reform could only take place by acknowledging error. “I was obliged to tell the truth about the past,” he later recalled, “whatever the risks to me.”37 But the system he was trying to preserve had itself been based, since the time of Marx and Engels, on the claim to be error-free. That was what it meant to have discovered the engine that drove history forward. A movement based on science had little place for confession, contrition, and the possibility of redemption. The problems Khrushchev created for himself and for the international communist movement, therefore, began almost from the moment he finished speaking. One was simple shock. Communists were not used to having mistakes admitted at the top, and certainly not on this scale. It was, as Secretary of State Dulles commented at the time, “the most damning indictment of despotism ever made by a despot.”38 The Polish party leader, Boleslaw Bierut, had a heart attack when he read Khrushchev’s speech, and promptly died. 1681

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He ordered farmers throughout China to abandon their crops, build furnaces in their backyards, throw in their own furniture as fuel, melt down their agricultural implements—and produce steel. The result of Mao’s “Great Leap Forward” was the greatest single human calamity of the 20th century. Stalin’s campaign to collectivize agriculture had caused between 5 and 7 million people to starve to death during the early 1930s. Mao now sextupled that record, producing a famine that between 1958 and 1961 took the lives of over 30 million people, by far the worst on record anywhere ever.46 1749

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War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War, By John Dower (Roaring 20's-WWII, Ethnicity & Race, Military & Foreign Policy)

War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War 

By John Dower 

Roaring 20's-WWII
Ethnicity & Race
Military & Foreign Policy

Thesis:

 Racism between the West and Asia made the war in the Pacific particularly merciless and brutal. Widespread wartime atrocities and civilian casualties were justified by racist sentiment that promoted the idea that this is what was required to defeat such an uncivilized foe. This thought process went both ways, West towards Asia, and Asia towards the West.

 

Specific examples/evidence that supports the thesis:

Summary: 
The author first describes the methods of propaganda that were inspired by racism and how these impacted the soldiers and the battlefield. The war was much more brutal with civilian casualties and war atrocities committed on both sides. Americans believed that the Japanese needed to exterminated like vermin not reprogrammed like the Germans. They believed that the only good Japanese were dead Japanese. The irredeemable quality of Japanese in the minds of Americans was unique. This was why even American citizens were placed in internment camps if they were of Japanese origin.
The Japanese felt that they were a pure people not diluted like the intermixed brutes of America. They saw the way Westerners conquered Asian people and felt they had no right to rule them. Japan felt they were the best fit to rule the Asian world.
Once the author established the racist attitudes back and forth between the Japanese and the Americans and how it ultimately led to a viciously brutal war, the author describes how these ideas were subverted into ideologies that fostered a peaceful occupation and thereafter a relatively friendly relationship between the two nations. The US once again found their mission to bring up a lesser people and act as the big brother. The US sought to bring the benefits of capitalist individualism to Japan.

 

What does this tell us about Ethnicity and Race in the Roaring 20's-WWII?

The racism of the of Pacific Theater of WWII demonstrates how Americans refused to see any Asian people as equal. Before Pearl Harbor, they believed that there was no way that the Japanese had any real power when compared to the West. After Pearl Harbor they were viewed as all following a single mind (the emperor) and empowered with no fear of death and an all sacrificing sub-human quality. Within the United States, the treatment of Japanese or even just anyone with Asian decent was terrible and got worse with Pearl Harbor. This was much different than people of German heritage. The atrocities committed on both sides of the battlefield were justified by racism. Here the ideas of scientific racism are present, advocating a stronger race that should rule over lesser peoples.

What does this tell us about Military & Foreign Policy in the Roaring 20's-WWII?
The author convincingly argues that the US policy in war towards Japan was hugely influenced by racism. The use of two atomic weapons when the war was clearly already won was justified with racist sentiment that this different type of people had to be completely subdued to the point of unconditional surrender. They had to agree to sacrifice their way of life and potentially their emperor. 

What parts of the book can be applied to lectures?

Frank Capra documentary, Know Your Enemy - Japan

General Thoughts:

It was really interesting that in this situation the US turned the Chinese into good guys (although still lesser people). The Chinese could be molded into good people but the Japanese had no hope of that.

Excerpts from Book Reviews: 

"Dower is exploring the propaganda of the US-Japanese conflict to delineate the "patterns of a race war," the cultural mechanisms of "othering," and the portability of racial/racist stereotypes."

"Yellow, Red, and Black Men" examines the notions of racial difference occupying the American mind since Columbus. More specifically, Dower outlines the concept of race war and the "Yellow Peril," and how this peril had become encoded in American immigration law."

"Once the war started, of course, the dehumanization of the enemy in the Pacific led to many notable atrocities on both sides of the conflict, from the infamous Bataan death march to the collection of noses, ears, teeth, and skulls by Allied soldiers, from the execution of three Doolittle Raid flyers to the slaughtering of surrendering Japanese at Bougainville. As Dower notes, these wartime atrocities spawned a vicious circle that, once publicized, led to more and more atrocities."

"Dower's study is fascinating. He shows the  interaction of racist ideas. To the Japanese, 
Japan's homogeneity, common purpose, corporate unity, and will were evidence of Japan's purity of race; to the Americans they were proof of Japan's primitiveness and uncivilized status. Americans, on the other hand, glorified individualism, creative entrepreneurship, and maximum individual liberty, all proof to the Japanese of America's racial heterogeneity and inability to mobilize its people to pursue anything morally worthwhile."

"How could such a savage killing frenzy as marked the final year of the war in the Pacific have been followed so suddenly by what still appears to be a benign occupation and subsequently friendly relations? The code words and images were malleable, he answers, and could be turned almost inside out. The yellow ape could become a pet, insanity could be cured with tender care, and the child could be shown how to mature-all expressions of American generosity, but also of American superiority. The Japanese did no less. The emperor invoked the national polity when he asked his people to endure the unendurable in defeat. The imperial institution was preserved, and Japanese began anew the struggle to find their rightful place in the world hierarchy."

My Highlighted Passages

"the Japanese were more hated than the Germans before as well as after Pearl Harbor. On this, there was no dispute among contemporary observers. They were perceived as a race apart, even a species apart -- and an overpoweringly monolithic one at that. There was no Japanese counterpart to the 'good German' in the popular consciousness of the Western Allies." (8) 

"as the war years themselves changed over into into an era of peace between Japan and the Allied powers, the shrill racial rhetoric of the early 1940s revealed itself to be surprisingly adaptable. Idioms that formerly had denoted the unbridgeable gap between oneself and the enemy proved capable of serving the goals of accommodation as well." (13)

"At the simplest level, they dehumanized the Japanese and enlarged the chasm between 'us' and 'them' to the point where it was perceived to be virtually unbridgeable." 

"transitions and juxtapositions in the Western image of the Japanese were abrupt and jarring: from subhuman to superhuman, lesser men to supermen. There was a common point throughout, in that the Japanese were rarely perceived as being human beings of a generally comparable and equal sort." (99)

"the metaphor of the child was used in a manner that highlighted the overlapping nature of immaturity, primitivism, violence, and emotional instability as key concepts for understanding the Japanese." (143)

"Where racism in the West was markedly characterized by denigration of others," writes Dower, "the Japanese were preoccupied far more exclusively with elevating themselves. While the Japanese were not inadept at belittling other races and saddling them with contemptuous stereotypes, they spent more time wrestling with the question of what it really meant to be 'Japanese,' how the 'Yamato race' was unique among the races and cultures of the world, and why this uniqueness made them superior."(204-205)

"the Japanese presented themselves as being 'purer' than others -- a concept that carried both ancient religious connotations and complex contemporary ramifications," (231-232)

"the Anglo-Americans were described as demons (oni), devils (kichiku), fiends (akki and akuma), and monsters (kaibutsu.)" (244)

"Despite such differences(in what tactics of racist rhetoric were used), however, the end results of racial thinking on both sides were virtually identical -- being hierarchy, arrogance, viciousness, atrocity, and death." (180) 

"To the victors, the simian became a pet, the child a pupil, the madman a patient."